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" 1/25/95 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE-NO.—U-13 431 
STATE OF NEW YORK-UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
NANCY HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
NORMA MEACHAM, ESQ., DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES (LEONARD R. 
KERSHAW and SUSAN G. WHITELEY of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the State of New York-Unified Court 
System (UCS) and the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). CSEA alleges in its charge that 
UCS violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the rates for 
and the conditions under which compensation is paid by UCS to 
court reporters for transcripts supplied to judges in the several 
courts in which CSEA's court reporters work and when UCS stopped 
requiring the production of two transcripts for criminal appeals. 
After several days of hearing, the ALJ held that UCS violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act in the following respects: 
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ending its practice in the Third Judicial 
District of paying $2,375 per page for daily 
transcripts and $2,075 per page for expedited 
transcripts when ordered by a judge; 
ending its practice in the Ninth Judicial District 
of paying $2.75 per page for daily transcripts and 
$2.00 per page for expedited transcripts when 
ordered by a judge; 
(3) ending its practice in Nassau County, Tenth 
Judicial District, of paying $2.00 per page for 
daily and expedited transcripts when ordered by a 
j udge. -1 
The ALJ dismissed the charge in all other respects. CSEA 
has filed cross-exceptions only to the ALJ's dismissal of the 
charge insofar as it pertains to the Fifth and Seventh Judicial 
Districts and Suffolk County in the Tenth Judicial District. 
UCS argues in its exceptions that it is permitted to 
discontinue the premium payments for daily and expedited 
transcripts pursuant to a 1983 Page Rate Agreement (PRA) which, 
it claims, fixes a per page rate of $1,375 for all transcripts 
under all circumstances. In a decision issued this date on a 
substantially similar charge (U-13410) filed against UCS by 
another union which represents other UCS court reporters, we 
-^Expedited transcripts in the Third, Ninth and Tenth Judicial 
Districts were those produced and delivered within three days of 
order. 
(1) 
(2) 
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rejected UCS's defense in this respect. Affirming the AKT, we 
there held that the PRA establishes only a base rate for regular 
transcripts and has no application to daily or expedited copy. 
Therefore, the PRA does not serve as a defense to UCS' unilateral 
abolition of premium payments for daily or expedited copy. We 
incorporate by reference our decision in U-13410, and for the 
reasons set forth more fully therein, affirm the findings of 
violation of §209-a.l(d) made by the AKT in this case. 
CSEA's cross-exceptions involve issues which were not 
presented in U-13410. As relevant to those cross-exceptions, the 
AKT dismissed the charge as it pertains to the Fifth and Seventh 
Judicial Districts on the ground that CSEA had not shown a change 
in practice regarding premium payments. Although the AKT found 
that a premium payment for such copy was made, the payment rates 
were not fixed. In the Fifth Judicial District, the rate for 
daily copy ranged from $1.75 to $5.00 per page and from $1.60 to 
$2.75 for expedited copy. In the Seventh Judicial District, the 
rate for expedited copy ranged from $2.25 to $2.75 per page.-7 
The AKT held that there could not be a violation of §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Act unless there was one specific rate of premium payment. 
We reverse the ALJ's decision insofar as he dismissed such 
of the §2 09-a.l(d) allegations pertaining to the Fifth and 
Seventh Judicial Districts as are the subject of CSEA's cross-
^There was no experience for judge-ordered daily copy in the 
Seventh Judicial District and the AKT dismissed the charge on 
that basis. CSEA has not taken any exception to that dismissal. 
! 
Board - U-13431 -4 
exceptions. The record establishes that a premium payment was 
made for daily and expedited copy in the Fifth Judicial District 
and for expedited copy in the Seventh Judicial District. Those 
premium payments have been discontinued by UCS and the rate of 
$1,375 per page now being paid by UCS is less than the low end of 
the range of the premium payments. The violation of the Act lies 
in the discontinuation of the premium payments previously made. 
The specific amount of the premium payment to be paid to a given 
court reporter submitting a particular copy under a given set of 
circumstances may affect the remedy, but it is not material to an 
assessment of violation. 
The ALJ also dismissed the charge as it pertains to court 
reporters in Suffolk County in the Tenth Judicial District. 
Crediting the testimony of a witness for UCS, Victor Rossomano, 
Senior Administrative Assistant, the ALJ held that there had not 
been a change in practice in Suffolk County related to expedited 
copy because the authorized rate of payment for expedited copy in 
Suffolk County since 1986 had been $1,375, the rate currently 
being paid by UCS. 
CSEA argues that the ALJ should not have credited 
Rossomano's testimony regarding expedited copy in Suffolk County 
because it was not supported by any documentary evidence. 
Testimonial evidence, however, need not be supported by 
documentary evidence to be persuasive and credible. Moreover, 
the documentary evidence supporting the testimony of CSEA's 
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witness that UCS had paid a premium for expedited copy in Suffolk 
County is equivocal and insubstantial. As an ALJ's resolution of 
credibility is entitled to great weight, and as the record does 
not establish a practice of paying a premium for expedited copy, 
the ALJ's dismissal of the allegations pertaining to expedited 
copy in Suffolk County must be affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed, except as to the dismissal of the §2 09-a.l(d) 
allegations pertaining to daily and expedited copy in the Fifth 
Judicial District and expedited copy in the Seventh Judicial 
District, as to which the ALJ's decision is reversed. UCS' 
exceptions, and such of CSEA's cross-exceptions as pertain to 
') 
Suffolk County, Tenth Judicial District, are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that UCS: 
1. Reinstate its practice of paying $2,375 per page for 
daily transcripts and $2.075 per page for expedited transcripts 
ordered by a judge in the Third Judicial District. 
2. Make unit employees in the Third Judicial District who 
produced and delivered daily transcripts and were not paid $2,375 
per page in accordance with practice whole for any loss of pay, 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Make unit employees in the Third Judicial District who 
produced and delivered expedited transcripts within three working 
days and were not paid $2,075 per page in accordance with 
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practice whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
4. Reinstate its practice of paying between $1.75 and $5.00 
per page for daily copy and between $1.60 to $2.75 per page for 
expedited copy ordered by a judge in the Fifth Judicial District. 
5. Make unit employees in the Fifth Judicial District who 
produced and delivered either daily copy or expedited copy 
ordered by a judge and were not paid in accordance with practice 
between $1.75 and $5.00 per page for daily copy and between $1.60 
and $2.75 per page for expedited copy whole for any loss of pay, 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Reinstate its practice of paying between $2.25 and $2.75 
per page for expedited copy ordered by a judge in the Seventh 
Judicial District. 
7. Make unit employees in the Seventh Judicial District who 
produced and delivered expedited copy ordered by a judge and were 
not paid in accordance with practice between $2.25 and $2.75 per 
page whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
8. Reinstate its practice of paying $2.75 per page for 
daily transcripts and $2.00 per .page for expedited transcripts 
ordered by a judge in the Ninth Judicial District. 
9. Make unit employees in the Ninth Judicial District who 
produced and delivered daily transcripts and were not paid $2.75 
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per page in accordance with practice whole for any loss of pay, 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
10. Make unit employees in the Ninth Judicial District who 
produced and delivered expedited transcripts within three working 
days and were not paid $2.00 per page in accordance with practice 
whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
11. Reinstate its practice of paying $2.00 per page for 
daily and expedited transcripts ordered by a judge in the Tenth 
Judicial District, Nassau County. 
12. Make unit employees in the Tenth Judicial District, 
Nassau County who produced and delivered daily transcripts and 
were not paid $2.00 per page when ordered by a judge whole for 
any loss of pay, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
13. Make any unit employees in the Tenth Judicial District, 
Nassau County who produced and delivered expedited transcripts 
within three working days and were not paid $2.00 per page when 
ordered by a judge whole for any loss of pay, with interest at 
the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Board - U-13431 
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14. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post notices of information to CSEA unit 
employees. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. "Kinbella, "chairperson 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLICLEMPLOYEESLEAIR EMPLOYMENT^Cr 
| we hereby notify the employees of the State of New York-Unified Court System (UCS) represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, that UCS will: 
1. Reinstate its practice of paying $2,375 per page for daily transcripts and $2,075 per page for expedited transcripts ordered 
by a judge in the Third Judicial District. 
2. Make unit employees in the Third Judicial District who produced and delivered daily transcripts and were not paid $2,375 
per page in accordance with practice whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Make unit employees in the Third Judicial District who produced and delivered expedited transcripts within three working 
j days and were not paid $2,075 per page in accordance with practice whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
availing maximum legal rate. 
4. Reinstate its practice of paying between $1.75 and $5.00 per page for daily copy and between $1.60 to $2.75 per page for 
expedited copy ordered by a judge in the Fifth Judicial District. 
5. Make unit employees in the Fifth Judicial District who produced and delivered either daily copy or expedited copy ordered 
by a judge and were not paid in accordance with practice between $1.75 and $5.00 per page for daily copy and between $1.60 
and $2.75 per page for expedited copy whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Reinstate its practice of paying between $2.25 and $2.75 per page for expedited copy ordered by a judge in the Seventh 
Judicial District. 
7. Make unit employees in the Seventh Judicial District who produced and delivered expedited copy ordered by a judge and 
were not paid in accordance with practice between $2.25 and $2.75 per page whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES ACEVEDO, 
Charging Party, 
=and= ^CASE^NO. U-12 386 
CATSKILL REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
HOLLIS GRIFFIN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MARK D. STERN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Catskill 
Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation (OTB) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that it had violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it discharged Charles Acevedo on December 26, 199 0, because he 
had tried to organize his fellow employees-7 for the purpose of 
collective negotiations. OTB, denying that Acevedo's discharge 
violated the Act, raised as a defense that Acevedo had been 
terminated not for his exercise of protected rights but for 
making derogatory remarks about Arthur Weinfeld, OTB'"s vice-
-/Acevedo had been a branch supervisor at the OTB's Sloatsburg 
parlor. 
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president and director of operations, at a Christmas party OTB 
sponsored on December 16, 1990.2/ 
After several days of hearing during 1991, the ALT issued a 
decision in 1992 sustaining Acevedo's charge.-/ In reaching his 
decision, the ALT took administrative notice of and relied upon 
several earlier cases in which OTB had been found to have 
violated the Act by engaging in retaliatory and intimidating 
conduct during organizing campaigns.-/ The ALT also found that 
the penalty was excessively harsh when compared with the degree 
of the offense committed by Acevedo, especially considering 
other, more serious incidents, in which the OTB had imposed such 
a penalty upon other employees.-/ Although the ALT noted that 
Acevedo had offered evidence that he had received disparate 
treatment on other occasions, he did not make any finding on that 
-/Acevedo, while speaking to Steven Pasquale, the OTB Field 
Auditor, and Sherry Brenner, OTB's new Personnel Manager, stated 
to Brenner when Weinfeld walked by: "That guy over there 
[pointing to Weinfeld] that guy is a dick. That guy is a dick. 
He fired my best friend. He's a dick". 
5/25 PERB 5(4619 (1992) . 
4/15 PERB 5(3023 (1982), aff'cr 14 PERB 5(4054 (1981); 15 PERB 5(3022 
(1982) ; 14 PERB 5(4518 (1981) ; 14 PERB 5(4011 (1981) ; and 13 PERB 
5(4028 (1980) . 
-/Over the last decade, Weinfeld has terminated fifteen employees 
for offenses which he characterized as repeated, excessive cash 
shortfalls, coupled with breach of corporate procedures, cover-up 
attempts, and numerous warnings to the recalcitrant employees. 
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evidence. Upon exceptions filed by OTB, we remanded the matter 
to the ALJ, finding that 
If the entire evidence presented by Acevedo had 
consisted of [OTB's previous improper practices and the 
harshness of the penalty imposed on Acevedo], we would 
be constrained to reverse the ALJ and dismiss this 
charge. -1 
We noted in our decision remanding the case to the ALJ that 
without evidence of anti-union animus closer in time and more 
directly related to Acevedo, we could not find that a continuing 
course of conduct by OTB with respect to organizing activity had 
been established.-7 As Acevedo had offered further evidence of 
disparate treatment proximate in time to his December 1990 
termination, that foul language was common in the workplace and 
had not been the subject of disciplinary action before, that he 
was under the influence of alcohol at the Christmas party, that 
he had tendered an apology to Weinfeld, and that anti-union 
remarks had previously been made to him, we instructed the ALJ to 
make findings of fact with respect to these assertions and to 
render a new determination based on those findings. 
Acevedo alleged disparate treatment in several instances. 
As to some, the ALJ found that the evidence did not support a 
finding that Acevedo had received disparate treatment. Acevedo 
alleged that he was not invited to attend a series of breakfast 
£/26 PERB 53024, at 3039 (1993). 
-
7It is conceded by OTB that Acevedo had been engaged in 
organizational efforts in the fall of 1989 and that OTB, and 
particularly, Weinfeld, were aware of his activities. 
Board - U-12386 -4 
meetings scheduled by Weinfeld with supervisory staff, but the 
ALT found that Acevedo was not the only supervisor who had not 
been invited. Acevedo also claimed that the failure of OTB to 
train him on a Customer Automated Teller (CAT) was evidence of 
disparate treatment, but the ALJ found that only supervisors of 
the largest branch offices of OTB were so trained. Therefore, 
Acevedo, as a supervisor at a small office, was not treated any 
differently from other, similarly situated supervisors. Finally, 
Acevedo asserted that he was subject to an inordinate number of 
audits during 1990. The ALJ found that although the number of 
audits of Acevedo's branch had been increased in that year, so 
had the number in many of the other OTB branches. 
The ALJ found evidence of improper motivation, however, with 
respect to a series of counseling memos Acevedo received from 
Weinfeld. In November 1989, shortly after Acevedo became 
involved in the organizing campaign-7 and shortly after Weinfeld 
became aware of his involvement, Ira Saper, then personnel 
manager for OTB, warned Acevedo, "unofficially", that "a 
Shockwave is coming out of Sloatsburg. I can't come and see you 
no more." Acevedo then received three counseling memoranda in 
-/in the fall of 1989, Acevedo began campaigning for Local 3 00-S, 
Production, Service and Sales District Council, H.E.R.E., AFL-
CIO, which requested recognition as the exclusive representative 
of all branch supervisors employed by OTB in March 1990. A 
representation petition was thereafter filed with PERB. A secret 
ballot election was held on June 12, 1990. Of 54 eligible 
employees, 48 cast ballots; 20 in favor of representation, 24 
against representation and 4 ballots were challenged. The union 
was, therefore, not certified as the bargaining agent. See 
Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp.; 23 PERB 53034 (1990). 
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short order. These were the first counseling memos Acevedo had 
received in fourteen years of satisfactory service with OTB. The 
first, dated November 21, cautioned Acevedo that he would be 
subject to disciplinary action if he violated security procedures 
and allowed an unauthorized person into the branch office's 
secure area;-' the second, dated November 22, threatened Acevedo 
with disciplinary action or termination if he failed to follow 
certain verification procedures;—f and the third, coming on 
November 23, warned Acevedo to stop disrupting other branch 
offices with phone calls and visits during business hours.—7 
Acevedo did not dispute the facts that gave rise to the memos, 
which were placed in his personnel file; he claims, however, that 
they were unjustified. 
-'Weinfeld testified that he had been informed that a person had 
been invited into the secure area of the Sloatsburg branch by 
Acevedo. Without any confirmation from Acevedo, or any further 
verification of the allegation, Weinfeld issued the counseling 
memo. 
—'Pasquale had reported to Weinfeld in September that he had 
observed Acevedo only counting the cash at the end of each day 
and not at the beginning, as was also required. When questioned 
by Weinfeld, Acevedo admitted that he had only been counting the 
cash once but would count it twice thereafter. There is no 
record evidence that Acevedo did not thereafter comply. In March 
1990, Weinfeld sent a memo to all branch supervisors reminding 
them to correct errors in the following of verification 
procedures, in order "to enhance your next evaluation." No 
mention was made of any possible disciplinary action. 
—'Acevedo had been contacting fellow employees about the union 
during these visits and phone calls, as Weinfeld had earlier 
refused his request to provide him with the names and home 
addresses of OTB employees so that he could contact them by mail,. 
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In March 1990, Weinfeld issued a fourth counseling memo to 
Acevedo regarding his contact of an 0TB board member, prohibiting 
him from such contact in the future. Weinfeld believed that the 
contact was part of Acevedo's attempts to bring a union into 0TB. 
Acevedo claimed that his contact had nothing to do with 
organizing; he was only trying to ascertain the date of the next 
board meeting and if it was open to the public. After a number 
of writings passed between them, Weinfeld finally, on April 4, 
1990, issued a memo to Acevedo, warning him that any future 
contact with board members would be severely punished. This memo 
followed a March 2 0 request that 0TB recognize the union as the 
bargaining representative of two units of employees. 
) Also in April 1990, Weinfeld, during a visit to the 
Sloatsburg branch office, warned Acevedo, after hearing from him 
that there had been a favorable turnout at an organizational 
meeting conducted earlier by Acevedo: "I wouldn't be doing this 
if I were you. I don't want to wind up going up to Albany, 
trucking up to Albany."Shortly thereafter, Pasquale audited the 
Sloatsburg office and, during his visit, opined to Acevedo that 
there wasn't much support for the union and that it would 
probably not get as many votes in this election as in the 
previous one. 
In the Spring of 1990, most supervisory employees received a 
bonus from 0TB for their work in 1989. Although Acevedo had 
previously received a bonus in every year in which one was given, 
i 
J 
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he did not receive one in 1990.—' While Weinfeld testified 
that the small size of the Sloatsburg office and Acevedo's 
reluctance to work on Sundays were factors considered in the 
determination not to give him a bonus, the ALJ found that in 
prior years, neither had precluded Acevedo from receiving a 
bonus.—7 Although Acevedo received a salary increase in 1989 
that was the largest he had ever received, it was still lower 
than that received by any of the other supervisors. 
The record further reflects, and the ALJ so found, that at 
least as between Weinfeld and Acevedo, the use of vulgar and 
coarse language was commonplace and had not been cause for any 
disciplinary action before. Weinfeld attempted to distinguish 
the incident at the Christmas party from Acevedo's previous use 
of foul language because it was directed at him personally, in 
his capacity as an executive staff member of OTB, and because the 
comment was made loudly and was overheard by a number of co-
workers. According to Weinfeld, Acevedo's comment had the effect 
of undermining his authority and it affected his ability to 
perform his professional responsibilities. The record, however, 
does not reflect that anyone other than Pasquale and Brenner 
heard Acevedo's remarks to Weinfeld. Indeed, Jay Gettinger, 
—''Of the approximately seven supervisors in Rockland County who 
did not receive bonuses, three were new employees and the others, 
with the exception of Acevedo, did not receive favorable 
evaluations. 
—indeed, Acevedo, unlike all the other branch supervisors, had 
been working on Saturdays during 1989, as he was directed to do 
by Weinfeld. 
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OTB's General Services Administrator, was standing nearby but did 
not hear the remarks.—7 
The ALT further found that Acevedo, when called upon on 
December 17 to explain his remarks to Brenner and Weinfeld, 
expressed no recollection of the incident. When told by them 
that others had heard the remarks, Acevedo said: 
If it happened that way and that's what I said, I must 
have had too much to drink. If it happened that way, 
I'm sorry.—' 
The exceptions filed by 0TB challenge the ALT's decision on 
remand in four areas: disparate treatment of Acevedo, use of 
profanities, Acevedo's inebriated condition and apology, i^ and 
remarks evidencing anti-union animus. 
As to the incidents of disparate treatment, we affirm the 
ALJ's findings. The counseling memos received by Acevedo in 
November 1989 and March 1990 followed action by the union in its 
—'Pasquale prepared an unsolicited memo for Weinfeld the next day 
setting forth the details of the incident with Acevedo at the 
Christmas party. Gettinger also prepared a memo for Weinfeld, 
stating that as he accompanied Acevedo away from Weinfeld, 
Pasquale and Brenner, Acevedo stated to him that he had just seen 
"that prick Weinfeld". 
—''Weinfeld, Brenner, and Pasquale met with David Groth, President 
of 0TB, prior to the meeting with Acevedo. A range of possible 
disciplinary actions was discussed, with Groth instructing the 
others that Acevedo be accorded "fair" treatment. Groth 
apparently had no further involvement in the matter and was 
surprised to learn at the hearing that Acevedo had attributed his 
remarks to the influence of alcohol and had apologized to 
Weinfeld. 
—
7While 0TB contests the extent of Acevedo's intoxication and the 
sincerity of his apology, nothing in the record warrants a 
disturbance of the ALJ's decision in these.respects. 
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organizing campaign, a campaign that OTB knew Acevedo was 
intimately involved with and supported. They also dealt with 
subjects which either had not been raised to Acevedo before (the 
March memo), which had not been investigated (the November 21 
memo), or were harsher than memos sent to other employees (the 
November 22 memo). The November 23 memo dealing with Acevedo's 
contact of other employees during business hours was issued 
although there are no work rules or guidelines prohibiting such 
conduct and such contact only took place because Weinfeld had 
refused Acevedo's request for the employees' home addresses for 
organizing purposes. 
The ALT found that the issuance of the counseling memos 
within such a short time after organizational activity, coupled 
with Saper's remark in November and Weinfeld's and Pasquale's 
April statements to Acevedo, raised the inference that the anti-
union animus which Weinfeld was found to harbor in previous 
improper practice charges was still present and was the 
motivating factor in the issuance of the memos to Acevedo. 
Likewise, he found the denial to Acevedo of a bonus for 1989 for 
the first time in his career was based upon anti-union animus. 
The record supports the ALJ's finding that profanities used 
by Acevedo in Weinfeld's presence had never before been the 
subject of discipline.. The record further supports the ALJ's 
finding that only Weinfeld, Pasquale and Brenner heard Acevedo's 
remark at the Christmas party. We find no basis to disturb the 
ALJ's decision that the remark made by Acevedo, while crude and 
I 
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inappropriate, was not the type of serious offense to warrant 
termination, especially in light of the particular circumstances 
surrounding the incident. 
Finally, the ALJ found that certain remarks attributed to 
Weinfeld and Pasquale did not, by themselves, evidence anti-union 
animus. On this point, we reverse the ALJ. Weinfeld's remark 
• was nothing less than a threat to Acevedo that his organizational 
activity was opposed by Weinfeld, that it would "inconvenience" 
Weinfeld and that it would be wise for Acevedo to discontinue 
such activity. While Pasquale's statement is not as overtly 
threatening as Weinfeld's, it too gets the message across to 
Acevedo that the corporation was aware of his activity, aware of 
' the degree of union support and was scrutinizing the process and 
I the active participants closely. These statements, even taken 
i 
i 
alone, but certainly coupled with the retaliatory actions taken 
against Acevedo, evidence anti-union animus on the part of 
Weinfeld and others in OTB's management structure. Taken 
together, the threatening statements, the disparate treatment 
with respect to the 1989 bonus and the counseling memos, and the 
excessive nature of the penalty imposed for Acevedo's ill-advised 
remarks establish that anti-union animus was the motivating 
factor in Acevedo's termination in December 1990.—' 
IZ/peer Park Union Free Sch. Dist. , 167 A.D.2d 398, 23 PERB 5[7021 
(3d Dep't 1990), confer 22 PERB J3014 (1989). 
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We find, therefore, that OTB violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of 
the Act when it terminated Acevedo in retaliation for his 
exercise of rights protected by the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that OTB immediately offer 
unconditional reinstatement to Acevedo to his former position as 
branch supervisor at its Sloatsburg branch office, with full back 
pay and benefits, plus interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate, from the date of his termination until the 
date of his re-employment or his refusal of the unconditional 
offer of reinstatement, and that OTB sign and post the attached 
notice at all locations customarily used to communicate with 
employees of OTB. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Ch airperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW^YORKTSTATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees employed by the Catskiil Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation (OTB) that OTB will 
immediately offer unconditional reinstatement to Charles Acevedo to his former position as branch supervisor at its 
Sloatsburg branch office, with full back pay and benefits, plus interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate, from 
the date of his termination until the date of his re-employment or his refusal of the unconditional offer of reinstatement. 
U 3 1 6 Q D B o n o o n o B o ^J t J o t s o B O B O o a n n o n n n B n H S B n n B a n n n n s a 
(Representative) (Title) 
CATSKILL REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING CORPORATION 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
my other material. 
2C- 1/25/95 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 282, 
Charging Party, 
_^and- - - CASE-NO.—U^157 66 
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY/REGIONAL 
TRANSIT SERVICE, INC., 
Respondent. 
BLITMAN & KING (JULES L. SMITH and HARRY B. BRONSON of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH & WILCOX (PETER J. SPINELLI and JEFFREY D. 
WILLIAMS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) filed by the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 282 
(ATU). As amended, ATU's July 1, 1994 charge against the 
Regional Transportation Authority/Regional Transit Service, Inc. 
(RTS) alleges that RTS violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The charge arises out of 
RTS' hiring and assignment of part-time employees pursuant to an 
April 18, 1994 voluntary interest arbitration award. Under the 
award, as clarified by the arbitrator, RTS is permitted to assign 
the part-time employees it hires notwithstanding the general 
seniority and job-bidding provisions in the parties' labor 
agreement. Finding that the arbitration award was converted by 
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the parties into a collective bargaining agreement, the Director 
dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegation pursuant to §205.5(d) of the 
Act, which denies us jurisdiction over violations of contract. 
He dismissed the §2 09-a.l(e) allegation on the ground that a 
collective bargaining agreement was in effect when the charge was 
filed and, therefore, there was no cause of action under 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
ATU excepts only to the Director's dismissal of the 
§209-a.l(e) allegation. ATU argues that the arbitrator's award 
and clarification did not effect a collective bargaining 
agreement. Therefore, the seniority and job-bidding provisions 
of its last collective bargaining agreement, which expired 
October 31, 1990, must be continued as a matter of statutory 
right under §209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision dismissing the §209-a.l(e) allegation. 
To resolve a long-standing impasse in their negotiations for 
a successor to a contract which had expired on October 31, 1990, 
the parties agreed in March 1993 to submit their dispute to 
"binding contractual determination". For all relevant purposes, 
the parties' agreement was to binding interest arbitration. The 
parties specifically provided in their submission to arbitration 
that: 
The award of the Determinator, taken together with any 
and all provisions of the expired collective bargaining 
agreement which were not subject to or affected by the 
award, shall constitute a binding and enforceable labor 
agreement ... effective November 1, 1990 through 
October 31, 1994. 
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Even if we assume that RTS' deployment of the part-time 
employees violated the seniority and job-bidding rights of the 
full-time employees, ATU does not have a cause of action under 
§2 09-a.l(e) of the Act. A cause of action under §2 09-a.l(e) of 
the Act is dependent upon an "expired" agreement and the parties 
have agreed upon a successor to the 1990 contract, thereby 
extinguishing any cause of action under §209-a.l(e). In reaching 
this conclusion, it is immaterial that an arbitration award is 
not an agreement within the meaning of the Act. Under the 
parties7 submission agreement, the arbitration award and those 
terms of the expired 1990 contract which were not submitted to 
the arbitrator were to constitute a successor labor agreement 
covering November 1, 1990 through October 31, 1994. The 
seniority and job-bidding provisions of the 1990 contract were 
not submitted for arbitration and, therefore, those terms became, 
by agreement, part of the 1990-94 contract, which was in effect 
when this charge was filed. The seniority and job-bidding 
provisions allegedly violated by RTS exist, therefore, not by 
statutory continuation of the expired 1990 agreement, but by the 
parties' successor 1990-94 agreement, in effect at all times 
relevant here. If, as ATU alleges, RTS' deployment of part-time 
employees violates the seniority and job-bidding provisions of 
that 1990-94 agreement, ATU has recourse in such other forums as 
are appropriate for breach of contract allegations. No cause of 
action exists, however, under §209-a.l(e) of the Act to require 
the continuation of the terms of the 199 0 contract because a 
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successor collective bargaining agreement was in effect on the 
date ATU's charge was filed. ATU's §209-a.l(e) allegation is, 
therefore, deficient as a matter of law and the Director properly 
dismissed that allegation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and ATU's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Ct hairperson 
Eisenberg, Membe/r 
2D- 1/25/95 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, APL-CIO 
and its affiliated LOCAL 1070, 
------—^ ———— — Charging—Party, - —. — — — — — — 
-and- CASE NO. U-13410 
STATE OP NEW YORK-UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON, ESQ. (JOEL 6ILLER of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
NORMA MEACHAM, DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES (LEONARD R. 
KERSHAW and SUSAN G. WHITELEY of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York - Unified Court System (UCS) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by District 
Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and its affiliated Local 1070 
(DC 37). DC 37 alleges that UCS violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, in late 
December 1991, it unilaterally changed its existing practices and 
the terms of an expired 1983 agreement regarding the rate of and 
conditions under which it pays court reporters for transcripts 
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(copy) supplied to judges in the several courts in New York City 
in which DC 37's court reporters work.-; 
After several days of hearing, the ALT held that UCS 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act in the following respects: 
1. ending its practice when only the court 
— — —orders the transcript of^paying^double — -
($2.75) the base rate ($1,375) per page for 
the production and delivery of "daily" copy; 
2. requiring "rush" or "expedited" transcripts 
in New York City Family Court and New York 
City Criminal Court to be supplied within 
three rather than five working days to 
qualify for any payment by UCS; 
3. ending its practice when only the court 
orders the transcript of paying double the 
base rate to New York City Family Court 
reporters for the production and delivery of 
"rush copy", i.e. that produced and delivered 
within five working days of recording; 
4. ending its practice of paying $1.65 per page 
to New York City Criminal Court reporters for 
the production and delivery of transcripts 
within five working days of order by a 
Judicial Hearing Officer. 
The A U also held that UCS violated §209-a.l(e) of the Act when 
it stopped paying court reporters a per page rate of $1,375 for 
transcripts other than daily, expedited or rush which are 
prepared and delivered to the judge before the close of the 
judicial proceeding. 
^DC 37 represents approximately 225 court reporters who work in 
Family Court, Criminal Court, Surrogate's Court and Civil Court 
within New York City. There are similar charges filed against 
UCS by unions representing court reporters in other units within 
and without New York City. The ALT decided these cases 
separately because there are some differences in facts and 
issues. To avoid confusion, we have not consolidated the cases 
for decision. 
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UCS argues in its detailed exceptions and supporting brief 
that it is obligated by law and authorized by agreement with 
DC 37 to pay for transcripts only when they are produced and 
delivered within three working days of recording, and then only 
at a rate of $1,375 per page. It denies that it violated the Act 
by abolishing premium payments for transcripts produced and 
delivered within three working days from recording or by stopping 
any payment for transcripts produced and delivered outside of 
that time frame. According to UCS, its abolition of premium 
payments was permitted under an expired 1983 Page Rate Agreement 
(PRA), which it claims clearly fixes the rate for any transcripts 
for which it must pay at $1,375 per page. It argues that the 
abolition of premium payments in late 1991 merely brought its 
practice into conformity with the PRA as implemented by the Rules 
of the Chief Administrator of the Courts.-' It further argues 
that the ALJ erred in admitting testimony regarding the history 
or intent of the PRA, but that, if admissible, the testimony the 
ALJ relied upon in construing the PRA is not credible. Regarding 
the stoppage of any payments for transcripts which are prepared 
and delivered after three working days from recording, it is UCS7 
position that such transcripts constitute "regular" copy, which 
must be furnished to judges free of charge under Judiciary Law 
-'An employer's reversion to the terms of an existing or expired 
agreement despite practices to the contrary does not violate the 
Act. State of New York-Unified Court System, 2 6 PERB 53 013 
(1993); Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist. , 15 PERB [^3025 (1982), 
aff'a 14 PERB f4625 (1981). 
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§299 as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Alweis v. Evans 
(hereafter Alweis) ,-' discussed infra. DC 37, in a similarly 
detailed response, argues that the ALJ's decision is correct in 
all relevant respects.-7 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision in this case. 
No exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's findings of 
material fact, only to the conclusions which can be properly 
drawn from them. Accordingly, we adopt the ALJ's findings of 
fact and incorporate them by reference. In brief background, UCS 
has for decades before and years after the 1983 PRA (an agreement 
reached with a coalition of unions, including DC 37), made 
premium payments to DC 37's court reporters for daily, expedited 
and rush transcripts.-f The State ended the premium payments 
for DC 37 unit reporters in December 1991 and now pays only 
$1,375 per page for daily, expedited or rush copy, as it defines 
those terms, on the basis that the PRA base rate applies to all 
transcripts. It also paid until December 1991, $1,375 pursuant 
5/69 N.Y.2d 199 (1987) . 
^The ALJ dismissed certain allegations in DC 37's charge and it 
has not taken any exceptions to the ALJ's decision in those 
respects. 
-'The definitions of those terms, the times within which those 
transcripts were to be prepared and delivered, and the amounts 
paid by UCS for those transcripts varied among the several 
negotiating units of court reporters and among judicial 
districts. It was in recognition of these differences that the 
ALJ issued separate decisions in the cases which are now on 
appeal to us. 
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to the PRA for "regular" transcripts produced at a judge's 
request before the close of the judicial proceeding. It 
discontinued those payments for what it deems to be "regular" 
copy after December 19, 1991, since that date paying only the 
$1,375 base rate for any copy produced and delivered within three 
working days from recording. 
UCS' exceptions are directed only to the AU's rejection of 
its defenses and we confine our discussion accordingly. UCS' 
primary defense rests on the expired 1983 PRA. In that respect, 
UCS argues that the interpretation of the PRA must be restricted 
to the written language of that agreement and that language 
establishes a flat rate of $1,375 per page for all transcripts. 
In relevant part, the PRA provides: "Payment for transcripts 
shall be made based on a per page rate which shall be defined in 
and established by the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge." 
The rate was initially established at $.75 per page in July 1984, 
with periodic increases to $1,375 per page as of July 1986, where 
it remains. 
UCS' PRA defense is grounded upon the parol evidence rule. 
We find that that evidentiary and substantive rule, which 
prohibits the receipt of evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
agreements to contradict or vary the terms of a fully integrated 
agreement, is inapplicable here. 
Parol evidence is unquestionably admissible to explain an 
ambiguity in a writing so as to ascertain the parties' intent. 
Conceding this, UCS argues that the ambiguity in the PRA was 
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created by the testimony of DC 37's main witness such that the 
parol evidence rule is applicable. We conclude, however, that 
the ambiguity which creates an exception to the parol evidence 
rule is inherent in the PRA. 
The controlling question with respect to this aspect of UCS' 
defense is whether the PRA applies to all transcripts under all 
circumstances of production and delivery and it is in that 
respect that the PRA is ambiguous. The words "transcripts" and 
"based on" are not defined or described by the parties' 
agreement. We cannot know from the agreement whether 
"transcripts" and "based on" were to have a common, general 
meaning or a special, restricted meaning within the reporting 
trade. The ambiguity is further compounded by a usage of those 
terms within a judicial system where there has been a wide 
variety of transcripts, prepared and delivered for decades under 
different circumstances and paid for at different rates. The 
words of the PRA require clarification in the context of the 
history of negotiation of the PRA and the long-standing 
transcript practice if the intent of the parties in using them in 
the PRA is to be ascertained. The testimony accepted by the ALJ, 
therefore, was not offered by DC 37 or used by the ALJ to 
contradict or vary the terms of the PRA, but as an aid to the 
clarification of the ambiguity in the agreement. The parol 
evidence rule does not bar testimony offered and used for that 
purpose. Having admitted parol evidence for this reason, it is 
immaterial whether it was otherwise admissible. . 
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In construing the PRA, the ALT relied upon the testimony of 
Lester Kane, a senior court reporter and the chief spokesman for 
the coalition of unions which negotiated the PRA with UCS. UCS 
argues that Kane's testimony, if admissible, is not credible. 
Having reviewed the record, however, we find no reason to 
question Kane's uncontradicted testimony. UCS had a full 
opportunity to rebut Kane's testimony, but it made no attempt to 
do so during the hearing. Moreover, Kane's testimony that the 
PRA only establishes a base rate for regular transcripts is 
wholly consistent with UCS' premium payment practice for years 
after the negotiation of the PRA, the existence of premium 
payments under the former statutorily based system of transcript 
compensation, which the PRA merely replaced, with UCS' proposals 
to modify the 1983 PRA in negotiations for a successor, the 
circumstances in which the PRA was negotiated, and UCS' 
continuation of premium payments for transcripts produced and 
delivered by nonunit per diem court reporters. These actions are 
entirely inconsistent with UCS' current claim that the 1983 PRA 
was intended to eliminate the premium payments for transcripts 
which UCS had made for years. Without evidence to the contrary, 
we cannot conclude that the parties intended to abolish premium 
rates paid to unit personnel for a wide variety of transcripts 
without any specific mention of that intent. It is the more 
reasonable interpretation of the PRA, and the one Kane confirmed, 
that the parties took only a first step in the PRA to standardize 
page requirements and to establish a contractual base rate for 
Board - U-13410 -8 
regular copy and left other transcript issues for resolution in 
subsequent negotiations. 
In reaching this interpretation of the PRA, we give full 
effect to the zipper clause in that agreement. The PRA 
represents the parties7 full agreement on the subjects it covers. 
The subject covered in relevant respect is a base rate for 
regular copy and the zipper clause extinguishes any duty to 
bargain on that issue. The zipper clause need not be and is not 
reasonably read, however, to establish that the PRA was intended 
to apply to all transcripts under all circumstances of production 
and delivery or to authorize the elimination of premium payments 
for daily, expedited or rush copy. 
Having concluded that parol evidence was admissible to aid 
in the interpretation of the PRA, we need not decide whether 
without that testimony the wording of the PRA is susceptible to 
the construction offered by UCS or the one urged by DC 37. 
The second major aspect of this charge concerns UCS' refusal 
on and after December 1991 to pay the PRA base rate of $1,375 for 
all transcripts which are produced and delivered outside the time 
frame UCS has used since December 1991 to define daily, expedited 
or rush copy.-/ As of December 1991, UCS deems all transcripts 
produced and delivered more than three working days from the 
recording to be regular copy which must be produced and delivered 
-'ucs's operating definition of "regular" copy was first those 
transcripts produced and delivered after three business days from 
recording, then three calendar days and it has most recently 
returned to a three working-day definition. 
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free of charge under Judiciary Law §299 as interpreted in Alweis. 
For several reasons, however, Alweis does not require or permit 
UCS to refuse payments for any transcripts other than those 
produced and delivered after the close of the judicial 
proceeding. UCS' arguments to the contrary extend well beyond 
the very limited holding in Alweis. 
The plaintiffs in Alweis were a small group of senior court 
reporters in the Fifth Judicial District who commenced an action 
for a declaratory judgment that Judiciary Law §299 was 
unconstitutional and that it had been repealed by implication by 
Judiciary Law §302. Judiciary Law §299 requires that transcripts 
ordered by judges for their own use be furnished by the court 
reporter free of charge. Judiciary Law §302, however, provides 
that a court reporter is entitled to fees for a transcript 
required, inter alia, by a judge. The plaintiffs in Alweis also 
sought damages and an injunction against UCS' directives to 
judges and justices in the Fifth Judicial District specifying 
that transcripts were to be ordered without charge to the State 
pursuant to Judiciary Law §299. 
In Alweis, the Court of Appeals held that Judiciary Law 
§§299 and 302 are not inconsistent and that the latter section 
had not impliedly repealed the former. The Court read Judiciary 
Law §299 to apply to regular transcripts and Judiciary Law §3 02 
to apply to daily and expedited copy. Regular copy had to be 
provided to a judge on request without separate charge by the 
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reporter. Compensation at public expense was required under 
Judiciary Law §302 for daily and expedited copy. 
Whatever implications Alweis has for this case stem from the 
apparent prohibition in Judiciary Law §299 against payment for 
regular transcripts ordered by a judge for his or her own use. 
The problem Alweis presents for this case is that the Court did 
not define regular, daily or expedited copy. There was, indeed, 
no issue in Alweis regarding payment for daily or expedited copy 
because the plaintiffs had been informed by UCS agents that 
payment would still be made to them for daily or expedited 
transcripts notwithstanding the directives. As to daily or 
expedited copy, the Court merely observed that such copy required 
"extraordinary" service or demand.-1 It described regular 
transcripts generally as those "which can be supplied under 
ordinary circumstances after the conclusion of the 
proceedings."-'' Moreover, the Court in Alweis had no occasion 
to and did not consider when, in particular, compensation was 
owed under Judiciary Law §302 or not owed under Judiciary Law 
§299. Although the record before the Court in Alweis contained 
the transcript payment practice within the Fifth Judicial 
District, a practice different from the one in this case, there 
is no suggestion from the Court's decision that it knew of the 
many varied transcript payment practices throughout the judicial 
•^ 69 N.Y.2d at 205 & 206. 
§/69 N.Y.2d at 206. 
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system and intended to adopt the Fifth Judicial District's 
practice as the Judiciary Law's definition of "regular" 
transcripts. Nor did the Court decide the validity of UCS' 
directives for any purpose relevant to the disposition of this 
case. In response to the plaintiffs' claim in that regard, the 
Court of Appeals merely noted that it was the Judiciary Law 
itself, not any UCS directives, which determined whether the 
court reporters were entitled to compensation. The Court 
concluded that aspect of its decision with the observation that 
"no other contention is before us on this appeal.11-7 
Alweis. therefore, is a narrow decision regarding the 
validity and application of two provisions of the Judiciary Law. 
There is nothing in that decision which assesses in any way UCS' 
bargaining obligations under the Act regarding the rate and the 
circumstances of compensation for court reporters. Alweis 
represents only an effort to reconcile two facially inconsistent 
statutory provisions. The Court's review in that respect ended 
when it concluded that there was a "reasonable field of 
operation"—7 for each statutory provision. 
Despite these limitations, UCS claims that the Court in 
Alweis implicitly held that regular copy within the meaning of 
Judiciary Law §299 is any copy produced and delivered after three 
working days of recording, regardless of the stage of the 
^69 N.Y.2d at 206. 
^69 N.Y.2d at 205. 
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judicial proceeding at which the request for the transcript is 
made. In rejecting this argument, the ALT held that Alweis 
relieves the UCS of its obligation under §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
to pay the base rate for regular copy only when those transcripts 
are produced and delivered after the close of the judicial 
proceeding. According to the ALT, it is the close of the 
judicial proceeding which marks the "conclusion of the 
proceedings" for purposes of application of Judiciary Law §299 
under Alweis. 
We concur with the ALT's conclusion that Alweis requires 
free copy only when that copy is produced and delivered after the 
close of the judicial proceeding for two basic reasons. 
First, the ALJ's conclusion in this respect is based upon 
specific language in Alweis. itself drawn from a much earlier 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Moynahan v. City of 
New York,—' which clearly equates the "conclusion of the 
proceedings" with the close of the case. In this respect, the 
Court appears to have held that "ordinary circumstances" arise 
only after the close of the case. UCS has discontinued all 
payments for any transcripts prepared and delivered in excess of 
three working days of their recording irrespective of the stage 
of the judicial proceeding, thereby disregarding Alweis' 
limitation. 
^205 N.Y. 181 (1912) . 
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Moreover, UCS' unilateral stoppage of all payments for 
transcripts produced and delivered more than three working days 
from recording would violate the Act even if we assume, as UCS 
argues, that the phrase "conclusion of the proceedings", as used 
in Alweis, is susceptible to more than one meaning. The Court in 
Alweis described regular copy as that which is supplied under 
"ordinary circumstances" after the conclusion of the proceedings. 
Thus, even on UCS' theory of Alweis, there are at least two 
elements in any definition of regular copy and its arguments 
ignore or minimize the first. Even if, as UCS argues, the 
"conclusion of the proceedings" can mean at the close of the 
case, or after a pretrial motion or hearing, or after a daily 
session of court, Alweis nonetheless leaves the parties free by 
agreement or practice to define when a transcript is produced 
under "ordinary circumstances" and, therefore, when it becomes 
"regular" and ineligible for compensation under Judiciary Law 
§299. To borrow a phrase from the Court's decision in Alweis, 
Judiciary Law §299 allows a "field of operation" for the Act in 
supplying, for purposes of assessing bargaining rights and 
obligations, the definition of "ordinary circumstances" which the 
Court in Alweis did not offer. We do not read the Court in 
Alweis as having held that "ordinary circumstances" necessarily 
has but one definition for purposes of the Judiciary Law fixed 
exclusively by an immutable number of days between the recording 
and delivery of transcripts. Where the parties to a collective 
bargaining relationship have by labor agreement or by established 
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practice thereunder, or separately, supplied the conditions under 
which compensation will be paid to reporters for transcripts, 
those agreements and practices are required to be continued in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act because those 
agreements or practices are not in violation of Judiciary Law 
§299 but in definition or supplementation of the terms of that 
statute as interpreted. The "ordinary circumstances" which 
distinguish free, "regular" copy from compensated, daily or 
expedited copy rest on the work of the court reporters in the 
preparation and delivery of that copy and it is the Act which 
permits and requires bargaining regarding the terms and 
conditions under which that work is rendered and paid. The 
parties are free under Alweis to define and particularize by 
agreements or practices under the Act the "ordinary 
circumstances" which characterize regular transcripts submitted 
before the "conclusion of the proceedings", no matter the 
definition accorded the latter phrase. 
In summary, neither the 1983 PRA, Judiciary Law §299, nor 
the Court of Appeals' decision in Alweis affords the UCS a 
defense to the violations of §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Act as 
found by the ALT. For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed and UCS' exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that UCS: 
1. Reinstate its practice of paying court reporters double 
the base rate of $1,375 per page for the production and delivery 
of daily copy when only the court has ordered the transcript and 
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reinstate its practice of paying the base rate of $1,375 per page 
for transcripts produced and delivered in other than a daily or 
expedited time frame, but before the close of a case. 
2. Reinstate its practice of paying court reporters $2.75 
per page for rush copy produced and delivered by a reporter in 
the New York City Family Court when the copy is ordered by a 
judge and is produced and delivered within five working days. 
3. Rescind and cease implementation of any work rules or 
directives requiring expedited or rush transcripts be supplied 
within three business days of the date of order to qualify for 
payment. 
4. Reinstate its practice of paying court reporters in the 
New York City Criminal Court $1.65 per page for a transcript or 
portion thereof when ordered by a Judicial Hearing Officer and 
produced and delivered within five working days. 
5. Make unit employees who produced and delivered daily 
transcripts and were not paid $2.75 per page when ordered only by 
the court whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Make unit employees who produced and delivered rush 
transcripts for New York City Family Court within five working 
days and were not paid $2.75 per page when ordered only by the 
court whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
7. Make unit employees who produced and delivered 
transcripts for New York City Criminal Court within five working 
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days and were not paid $1.65 per page when ordered by a Judicial 
Hearing Officer whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
8. Make unit employees who produced and delivered 
transcripts in other than a daily or expedited time frame, but 
before the close of a case, and were not paid $1,375 per page 
whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
9. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used by UCS to post notices of information to DC 37 
unit employees. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees of the State of New York-Unified Court System (UCS) represented by District Council 37, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and its affiliated Local 1070, that UCS will: 
1. Reinstate its practice of paying court reporters double the base rate of $1.375 per page for the production and delivery 
of daily copy when only the court has ordered the transcript and reinstate its practice of paying the base rate of $1,375 per 
page for transcripts produced and delivered in other than a daily or expedited time frame, but before the close of a case. 
2. Reinstate its practice of paying court reporters $2.75 per page for rush copy produced by a reporter in the New York 
City Family Court when the copy is ordered by a judge and is produced and delivered within five working days. 
3. Rescind and cease implementation of any work rules or directives requiring expedited or rush transcripts be supplied 
jhin three business days of the date of order to qualify for payment. 
4. Reinstate its practice of paying court reporters in the New York City Criminal Court $1.65 per page for a transcript 
or portion thereof when ordered by a Judicial Hearing Officer and produced and delivered within five working days. 
5. Make unit employees who produced and delivered daily transcripts and were not paid $2.75 per page when ordered 
only by the court whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Make unit employees who produced and delivered rush transcripts for New York City Family Court within five working 
days and were not paid $2.75 per page when ordered only by the court whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
7. Make unit employees who produced and delivered transcripts for New York City Criminal Court within five working 
days and were not paid $1.65 per page when ordered by a Judicial Hearing Officer whole for any loss of pay, with interest 
at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
8. Make unit employees who produced and delivered transcripts in other than a daily or expedited time frame, but before 
the close of a case, and were not paid $1,375 per page whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME, COUNCIL 66, LOCAL 1614, CASE NO. D-0255 
AMSTERDAM, NEW YORK, 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
2-1=0.1 of—the Civil Service—Law^ — 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 14, 1994, this agency's Counsel filed a charge 
alleging, as amended, that AFSCME, Council 66, Local 1614, 
Amsterdam, New York (respondent) violated Civil Service Law (CSL) 
§210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and 
engaged in a strike against the City of Amsterdam (City) on 
December 19, 1993. 
The respondent requested Counsel to indicate the penalty he 
would be willing to recommend to this Board as appropriate for 
the violation charged. Respondent proposed to withdraw its 
answer, and thereby admit the factual allegations of the amended 
charge, on the understanding that Counsel would recommend and the 
Board would accept a penalty of loss of respondent's right to 
have dues and agency shop fees deducted for a period of three 
months, commencing on the first practicable date following the 
issuance of this decision. Counsel has so recommended. 
Board - D-0255 -2 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
respondent violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike as 
charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction rights 
of the AFSCME, Council 66, Local 1614, Amsterdam, New York, be 
suspended, commencing on the first practicable date following the 
issuance of this decision, and continuing for such period of time 
that twenty-five percent (25%) of its annual agency shop fees, if 
any, and dues would otherwise be deducted. Thereafter no dues or 
agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf by the City of 
Amsterdam until the respondent affirms that it no longer asserts 
the right to strike against any government}as required by the 
provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
2F- 1/25/95 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNION-ENDICOTT MAINTENANCE WORKERS 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, APT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- _ _ -and^___^_ _____ ____ CASE NO.U-14226-^ 
UNION-ENDICOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
COUGHLIN & GERHART (FRANK W. MILLER of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) 
The Union-Endicott Central School District (District) seeks 
to appeal a ruling by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made 
during the processing of a charge filed by the Union-Endicott 
Maintenance Workers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association). 
As one defense to the charge, the District argues that it 
must be dismissed because the Association has not satisfied the 
notice of claim requirements under Education Law §3813. By 
letter dated December 13, 1994, the ALJ notified the parties that 
decision on the District's notice of claim defense was being 
reserved and that a second day of hearing on the charge was 
Board - U-14226 -2 
scheduled for February 9, 1995.-' The parties were instructed 
in that letter to be prepared to present relevant facts regarding 
the notice of claim issue during the hearing. 
The District seeks to appeal the ALJ's declination to render 
a decision on its notice of claim defense before resuming the 
hearing. It argues that the ALJ's ruling effectively deprives it 
of the benefit of that defense. According to the District, an 
ALT has no discretion to proceed to a hearing on the merits of a 
charge when a notice of claim defense has been raised. It argues 
that the notice of claim issue must be severed from any other 
issues, any hearing required as to that defense must be held and 
a decision on that defense rendered before there can be any 
hearing or determination on any other issue raised in or by the 
improper practice charge. 
An appeal from an ALJ's interlocutory ruling is by our 
permission only.-7 As interlocutory appeals necessarily delay 
the completion of proceedings, we have not often entertained such 
appeals. Our review is warranted prior to the conclusion of the 
proceedings before the ALJ only if our declination to accept the 
appeal would cause harm to the appellant which cannot be remedied 
-'The case was held in abeyance after the first day of hearing 
until the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal from the 
Appellate Division, Third Department's decision in Union-Endicott 
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 197 A.D.2d 276, 27 PERB f7005 (1994), 
in which the Court held Education Law §3813 applicable to at 
least certain improper practice proceedings. 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.7(h)(2). 
Board - U-14226 -3 
by our review of the final decision and order^ or the ruling 
subject to appeal constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.^ 
The ALJ's decision to proceed with the hearing in this case 
does not deprive the District of its notice of claim defense, nor 
do we find any basis for a conclusion that severance of a notice 
of claim defense is required as a matter of law. Attendance and 
participation at a hearing on the merits is not the type of harm 
which warrants review of a nonfinal ruling or order simply 
because there is a possibility that the charge may be ultimately 
dismissed on other than a merits basis.-7 Neither was the ALJ's 
ruling in this case without articulated reason such as might 
warrant review by us at this time on the basis of a clear abuse 
of discretion. The ALJ's letter to the parties states that there 
may be fact questions affecting the disposition of the notice of 
claim defense. A determination to continue the hearing in that 
circumstance is within the range of discretion regularly accorded 
to AKJs and is not so prejudicial to the District as to warrant 
the piecemeal review which our rule intends to avoid. 
There being no ground presented which meets our standards 
for an extraordinary interlocutory review, we will not consider 
the District's appeal of the ALJ's ruling at this stage of the 
proceeding. Our decision is without prejudice to the District's 
^State of New York (Div. of Paroled. 25 PERB f3007 (1992); 
United Univ. Professions, 19 PERB H[3009 (1986) . 
^County of Nassau, 22 PERB [^3027 (1987) . 
^See, e.g. , Mt. Morris Cent. Sch. Dist. . 26 PERB [^3085 (1993) . 
Board - U-14226 -4 
right to file such exceptions to the ALJ's final decision and 
order as it considers to be warranted pursuant to §204.10 of the 
Rules. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
M J ^ X - ^ Q ^ U 
Pauline R. Kinsella," Chairperson 
Walt Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, SUFFOLK 
EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 870, DEER PARK UNIT, 
— — — — — Charging Party, — — - - - -
-and- CASE NO. U-14038 
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BAISLEY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
COOPER, SAPIR & COHEN, P.C. (ROBERT SAPIR of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Suffolk Educational Local 870, Deer Park Unit (CSEA) and cross-
exceptions filed by the Deer Park Union Free School District 
(District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed CSEA's charge that the 
District violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act)-7 by unilaterally discontinuing its 
-'CSEA amended its charge at the hearing to withdraw an 
allegation relating to custodians. The ALJ also permitted CSEA 
to further amend its charge at the second day of hearing to 
include the alleged violation of §2 09-a.l(e) of the Act. No 
exceptions were taken to these rulings. 
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practice of paying bus drivers who drove parochial school and 
pre-kindergarten runs for "down time" when the District was 
closed or had no work for them to perform. 
The District raised an affirmative defense of waiver in its 
answer and also argued that the New York State Constitution, 
Article 8.1, prohibited the continuation of the payments sought 
by CSEA. At the second day of hearing, the District amended its 
answer to allege that PERB lacked jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the charge. After the close of the hearing, but before 
briefs were submitted, the District again sought to amend its 
answer, to assert as an additional defense that CSEA had failed 
to file a timely notice of claim as required by §3 813 of the 
) 
Education Law. CSEA opposed the amendment. 
The ALJ refused to allow the District to amend its answer to 
include a defense that CSEA had failed to file a timely notice of 
claim pursuant to §3813 of the Education Law. On the merits, the 
ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegation, finding that the 
parties' contract contained a management rights clause which 
effectively waived CSEA's right to negotiate the alleged change. 
She further found that CSEA had failed to establish a past 
practice which would entitle it to the payments it was seeking. 
The AKJ also dismissed the §209-a.l(e) allegation on the ground 
that the expired agreement did not contain any provision with 
respect to the payments in issue. 
Board - U-14038 -3 
CSEA excepts to the dismissal of the charge, arguing that 
the ALJ erred in her findings that no past practice existed and 
that there was a waiver of negotiating rights.-1 The District 
supports the ALJ's decision except to the extent that she did not 
allow the District to amend its answer to allege the Education 
Law §3813 claim. CSEA, in its response to the District's cross-
exceptions, supports the ALJ's determination to disallow the 
post-hearing amendments to the answer. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
CSEA represents a unit of noninstructional employees, 
including bus drivers. Some bus drivers bid for and are assigned 
to drive parochial school runs or pre-kindergarten runs, which 
are sometimes done on days when the District is closed. CSEA 
alleges that those drivers have always been paid for a full day 
by the District even though no mid-day or late afternoon runs 
were being made. In September 1992, the District's new 
Transportation Supervisor implemented a practice by which bus 
drivers would be paid only for the hours they actually worked and 
would no longer receive pay for down time. 
-'CSEA takes no exception to the ALJ's dismissal of the alleged 
§209-a.l(e) violation. 
Board - U-14038 -4 
Article XVIII of the parties7 1992-1995 collective 
bargaining agreement includes the following management rights 
clause: 
It is expressly understood and agreed that the 
Board, except as to those matters herein provided, 
reserves exclusively to itself the right to cancel, 
"affiend^  change, modify, or revise any and~~aTl existing 
rules and policies and/or to institute or adopt new 
rules, regulations, orders and policies on any and all 
matters and subjects. The provisions of Article XVI 
shall not apply to this article.-7 
Turning first to the District's cross-exceptions, it argues 
that the ALJ erred by not allowing it to amend its answer for a 
second time, to include a defense that CSEA had failed to include 
proof in its charge that it had filed a notice of claim as 
required by §3813 of the Education Law.-7 The District argues 
that it should have been allowed to amend its answer post-hearing 
because the applicability of Education Law §3813 to improper 
practice proceedings had been decided by the Appellate Division 
in Union-Endicott Central School District v. Public Employment 
-
7Article XVI provides: "It is agreed by and between the parties 
that any provision of this Agreement requiring legislative action 
to permit its implementation by amendment of law or by providing 
the additional funds therefore, shall not become effective until 
the appropriate legislative body has given approval." The 
contract also provides, at Article XVII: "It is expressly 
understood and agreed that all negotiable subjects have been 
discussed during the negotiations leading to this agreement and 
negotiations will not be re-opened on any matter whether 
contained herein or not during the term of this agreement." 
-•^Education Law §3813 requires a notice of claim to be filed with 
a school district as a condition precedent to the commencement of 
an action against the school district. 
Board - U-14038 -5 
Relations Board-7 shortly before it made its motion to amend the 
answer. The Appellate Division there affirmed a finding of 
Supreme Court, Albany County that the notice of claim 
requirements of §3813 are applicable to at least certain of 
PERB's improper practice proceedings. The ALJ, exercising the 
discretion granted under §204.3(e) of our Rules of Procedure to 
permit an amendment to an answer for good cause shown, declined 
to grant the District's request. We affirm her ruling. 
There is no abuse of discretion when an ALJ, after the close 
of the record, declines to allow a party to amend an answer where 
no good cause is shown and the facts or argument sought to be 
included in the amendment were known to or discoverable by that 
party before the hearing was concluded.-1 
While an Education Law §3813 claim, however, need not be 
raised in an answer,-7 it must be timely raised before the court 
of original jurisdiction or it is waived.-7 Here, although it 
did not raise it in its answer, the District placed the Education 
Law §3813 claim before the ALJ, whom we have held to be the 
administrative agency equivalent of the court of original 
^197 A.D.2d 276, 27 PERB [^7005 (3d Dep't 1994), motion for leave 
to appeal denied, N.Y.2d , 27 PERB [^7012 (1994). 
^Addison Cent. Sch. Dist., 17 PERB ^3076 (1984). 
^Flanagan v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 613 
(1979) . 
S'ld. 
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jurisdiction.-7' Therefore, the question is whether that claim 
was timely raised before the ALJ. In Cocrer v. Davidoff.—7 the 
Appellate Division held that the failure to raise a notice of 
claim defense before answering on the merits waived the 
respondent's right to assert the Education Law §3813 claim. In 
Harder v. Binqhamton City School District,—7 the Court, citing 
to Coger, supra, found that the notice of claim defense had been 
properly raised by the respondent in its answer and objections in 
point of law. These decisions support the conclusion that while 
the Education Law §3813 claim need not be raised as an 
affirmative defense in an answer, it must be raised to the ALJ 
either before or at least in the answer. Here, the District's 
failure to raise the issue of not filing a §3813 Education Law. 
notice of claim until after the hearing in the case had been 
concluded constitutes a waiver of that defense. 
As to CSEA's exceptions, the ALJ dismissed the charge on a 
finding that CSEA had waived its right to negotiate the change
 ( 
alleged to have been made in the charge on the basis of the 
language in Article XVIII of the CSEA-District contract—7 and 
the testimony of the CSEA unit president that she understood that 
"the contract is what the Board of Education has agreed to abide 
2/See Mt. Markham Cent. Sen, Dist. , 27 PERB <[3 03 0 (1994) = 
^
771 A.D.2d 1044 (4th Dep't 1979). 
^1B8 A.D.2d 783 (3d Dep't 1992). 
—
7The ALJ did not address the language of Article XVII. 
Board - U-14038 -7 
by, okay, and if it is not in here, they have the right to amend, 
modify or change if it is not part of this total agreement."—7 
We agree that the language of Article XVIII, although broad, 
is a clear grant of right to the District with respect to the 
subject matter of the instant charge.—7 It constitutes an 
explicit and unambiguous waiver of CSEA's right to bargain 
matters not contained in the parties7 collective bargaining 
agreement during the contract term. We, therefore, find that the 
§209-a.l(d) allegation was properly dismissed. The ALJ's 
decision is, accordingly, affirmed.—7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
—
7The CSEA President did question whether the complained of 
actions of the District constituted a change in "policy". 
^
7County of Livingston, 26 PERB'f3074 (1993); Sachem Cent. Sch. 
Dist. , 21 PERB J[3021 (1988) . 
—
7We, therefore, need not rule on CSEA's exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision that no past practice existed regarding the at-issue 
payments. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SEWER DISTRICT #11 
BARGAINING GROUP, 
•Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4317 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SEWER DISTRICT #11, 
Employer, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, IBT, 
Intervenor. 
RAYMOND HOAG, for Petitioner 
JAMES FISCHBECK, for Employer 
KEVIN HUNTER, for Intervenor 
BOARD ORDER 
On December 20, 1994, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation issued a decision in the above 
matter finding that the petition filed by the Washington County 
Sewer District #11 Bargaining Group (petitioner) to decertify the 
Teamsters Local 294, IBT as negotiating representative for 
certain of its employees should be granted for lack of 
opposition.-7 No exceptions have been filed to the decision. 
27 PERB 14080. 
Case No. - C-4317 page 2 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Teamsters Local 294, IBT 
be, and it hereby is, decertified as the negotiating 
representative of the following unit of employees of the 
employer: 
Included: Sewage Treatment Plant Operator, Sewer 
—- - - —^—-——--Ma-i-nfcenanee--Worker-,—Sewer—Line--an.d—P-ump—Sfca-tion 
Maintainer and Laborer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
f^J:. X. £uJ\ 
P a u l i n e R. K m s e l l a , C h a i r p e r s o n 
L i t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Member Walt 
3A-- 1/25/95 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE UNION FOR CORRECTION OFFICERS & LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4303 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
: ) ; : 
i 
! CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
I A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED' that the Security and Law Enforcement 
Employees, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
Certification - C-4303 - 2 -
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees within the Security Services 
Unit. 
Excluded: All other, employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Security and Law 
Enforcement Employees, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 2 5, 1994 
Albany, New York 
4 ? , . K? I, ' I ,^1— %t^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membert 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUBSTITUTES UNITED IN BROOME, NYSUT/ 
AFT/AFL-CIO, LOCAL 4707, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4309 
OWEGO APALACHIN CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, Local 4707 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Per diem substitute teachers and per diem 
substitute nurses. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, Local 4707. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of.employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOCES UNITED EMPLOYEES, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4334 
MONROE BOCES #1, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the BOCES United Employees, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All counselors and instructors employed by 
Monroe BOCES #1 in the Adult and Community 
Education Program on a school or calendar year 
basis who are regularly scheduled to work at 
least 2 0 hours per week. 
I 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the BOCES United Employees, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
tlie^mutAiaX-obl-i-gati-on—to—mee^^ 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 25, 1995 
Albany, New York 
^J/^tJ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memk 
Eric/JX Schmertz, Member ' 
